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Abstract
We develop a model in which non-white individuals are deﬁned with respect to
their social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and their attachments to their
culture of origin (religion, language), and in which jobs are mainly found through
social networks. We ﬁnd that, depending on how strong peer pressures are, non-
whites choose to adopt “oppositional” identities since some individuals may identify
with the dominant culture and others may reject that culture, even if it implies
adverse labor market outcomes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the spring and early summer of 2001 there were a series of violent distur-
bances in various cities and towns in England involving mainly South Asian youth
and the police. As a consequence, a number of local and national enquiries were
formed to investigate the causes. Though a range of potential explanations were
proposed, two received considerable attention both in political circles and in the
media. First, the lack of a shared civic identity to bring together diverse communi-
ties. Second, increasing segregation of communities on economic, geographic, racial
and cultural lines even where this reﬂected individual preferences.
The interest paid to these two factors is relatively novel in the UK, and does
represent a departure from the long-standing debate in the UK which has tended
to emphasize racial discrimination as the key force in driving ethnic disadvantage
(CRE, 2002).1 The debate in the US, at both a policy and academic level, on
these types of issues is of longer standing. One theme that has emerged from the
academic literature is that some individuals in ethnic groups may “choose” to adopt
what are termed “oppositional” identities. Where a community or group is socially
excluded from a dominant group, some individuals of that group may identify with
the dominant culture and others may reject that culture.2 T h i sm a yo c c u re v e ni f
the latter groups preferences involve a lower economic return. From the standpoint
of those who choose not to take a rejectionist stance, the rejectionists are making
poor economic decisions; they are engaging in self-destructive behavior.
Such preferences may stem from a lack of economic opportunity, discrimina-
tion or it may stem from a desire to display greater racial or religious solidarity
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Ihlanfeldt and Scaﬁdi (2002) evoke a wish to share
culture, prejudice against whites, or expectations of unfavorable treatment by whites
against non-whites in white neighborhoods. One could also think of the advantages
that members of a minority group can derive from locating close to one another,
thereby improving their access to ‘ethnic goods’ such as food, education or religious
service, not to mention the ability to socially interact in their own language. An-
other related literature focusing on the academic achievement of African American
youths argues that African American students in poor areas may be ambivalent
about learning standard English, where this may be regarded as “acting white”
and adopting mainstream identities (Ogbu, 1978; Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Delpit,
1995; Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005).
In this paper, we develop a model in which non-white individuals are deﬁned with
respect to their social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and their attachments
to their culture of origin (religion, language), and in which jobs are mainly found
1For further details see Building Cohesive Communities (2001) and the Cantle Report (2001).
2An alternative explanation revolves around qualiﬁcations: skilled minorities could beneﬁtm o r e
from integration than unskilled minorities (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).
2through social networks. Non-whites must decide to totally or partially adopt the
white’s culture or to reject it by anticipating the implications of this choice on their
labor market outcomes. Interacting with whites is beneﬁcial because non-white
workers may then beneﬁt from the high quality of whites’ social networks since the
latter do not suﬀer discrimination. We found that, totally identical individuals can
e n du pw i t ht o t a l l yd i ﬀerent choices. Indeed, depending on the strength of peer
pressures, non-whites choose to adopt “oppositional” identities since some of them
may identify with the dominant culture and others may reject that culture. We
found in particular that some non-whites will totally reject the white’s culture even
though they know that it will sharply decrease their chance of being employed.
Few theoretical models have investigated the link between ethnic preferences and
labor market outcomes. Akerlof (1997) discusses informally a model that has these
features whereas Selod and Zenou (2005) essentially focus on the urban consequences
(i.e. ghettos) of ethnic preferences. There are also some recent papers that have
focussed on the links between identity and education. Akerlof and Kranton (2002)
propose a theory in which a student’s primary motivation is his or her identity and
the quality of a school depends on how students ﬁt in a school’s social setting. In an
innovative paper, Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) model peer pressures in education
by putting forward the tension faced by individuals between signalling their type to
the outside labor market and signalling their type to their peers: signals that induce
high wages can be signals that induce peer rejection. One of their main results is
to show that the more individuals discount the future, the more acute peer pressure
becomes and the more homogeneous groups are (in terms of education).
2T h e t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
In this section, we would like to derive a simple model showing that ethnic prefer-
ences (the desire or reluctance to interact with individuals of other ethnic groups)
can have strong implications in the labor market. There are two stages. In the ﬁrst
one, non-white individuals decide to adopt the white’s norm or not anticipating the
implications of this choice on their labor market outcomes. This is the second stage.
Before describing each stage, we will ﬁrst set out the utilities of the workers and
how workers obtain a job.
2.1 Ethnic preferences and utilities
There is a ﬁnite number of non-white and white individuals, which are respectively
given by NNW and NW,w i t hNNW+NW = N. We assume that NW >N NW,w h i c h
is the case in most areas (cities, regions, etc.) in developed countries. Whites and
nonwhites are totally identical; they just diﬀer by an observable trait, which is the
color of their skin. The social space is the interval [0,1]. For simplicity, the white’s
3norm is normalized to zero and all other workers (non-whites) deﬁne themselves
with respect to this norm.
As we will see below, non-white workers optimally choose their “location” 0 ≤
x ≤ 1 in the social space. In this interval, there are two extreme locations: x =0
means to totally adopt the white’s norm and thus to totally reject the norm of the
ethnic group the worker belongs to, whereas x =1implies the contrary (to totally
reject the white’s norm and thus to totally adopt the norm of the ethnic group the
worker belongs to). Any location’s choice of 0 <x<1 leads to a behavior which is
in between these two extremes. Thus, the larger x the more distant the worker is
from the white’s norm and the closer he/she is to his/her own community.
Available data does indeed reveal a range of preferences and hence locations
across social space for diﬀerent ethnic group members. For example, the UK Fourth
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) undertaken in 1993/94 asks eth-
nic respondents about their identiﬁcation with Britishness, attitudes towards inter-
marriage and preferences in terms of the ethnic makeup of their own child’s school.
This information can be used to locate individual ethnic groups in social space
(x)r e l a t i v et ot h ew h i t em a j o r i t y . T a b l e1reveals that nearly three-quarters of
African-Asians thought of themselves as British compared to only just over a half
of Bangladeshis.3 The Caribbeans on this measure seem to be the furthest from the
white majority with one-third likely to disagree with being British. This contrasts
with the West Indian migrants of the 1940s and 1950s who by most accounts thought
of themselves as British and often talked of coming to “the mother country” (Mod-
ood et al. 1997). The Chinese in Table 1 stand out since roughly equal percentages
agreed and disagreed with the notion of being British (44% and 41% respectively).
On this dimension at least the Chinese seem to sit at both extremes in terms of their
location in social space.
Table 2 provides some data on another dimension of identity, namely marriage
and in particular attitudes to inter-marriage. Inter-marriage can be considered a
measure of social assimilation and also a factor producing it (Pagnini and Morgan,
1990). On the other hand some ethnic and religious groups regard inter-ethnic
marriage as a potential threat endangering and undermining ethnic identities. In
the FNSEM individuals were asked “If a close relative were to marry a white person
would you not mind, would you mind a little, would you mind very much?” Here
signiﬁcant percentages of the three South-Asian groups said they would mind very
much with the greatest hostility being among the Pakistani population (37% of them
say they would mind very much a mixed marriage). On this dimension signiﬁcant
numbers of South-Asians display low levels of social assimilation and are close to 1
in social space. A majority of the other groups said that they would not mind and
3The African-Asians arrived in the UK from the late 1960s following persecution and forced
expulsion from a number of East African countries.
4amongst Caribbeans, African-Asians and the Chinese the percentages that would
mind very much are quite small.4 The evidence for the Caribbean population is
somewhat unsurprising given that in 1991 27% of married or cohabiting Caribbean
males had a white partner (Peach, 2005).
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
Tables 3 and 4 relate to an important area of controversy both in the UK and US;
t h er o l eo fs c h o o l si nk e e p i n gd i ﬀerent ethnic communities apart. Individuals in the
FNSEM were asked about the importance of ethnicity in choosing a school (Table
3) and the proportion of one’s ethnic group they would like in their own children’s
school (Table 4). There are indirect ways to distance oneself from the white culture
since separate schooling makes the interaction with whites more diﬃcult. The ethnic
makeup of a school was deemed an important consideration for around one-third of
Caribbean’s, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Less than a quarter of African-Asians
and Indians and only one in ten Chinese thought this important. Table 4 gives some
data on the preferred proportion of one’s ethnic group in a school. Of those who did
have a preference over a third of Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis wanted
a school with half or more from their own ethnic group. For African-Asians and
Indians the equivalent ﬁgures are lower and for the Chinese considerably lower.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]
On these dimensions then African-Asians and the Chinese have an x closer to 0.
They are socially assimilated and economically successful (Peach, 1996). The Indian
population seems to stand somewhere in the middle having done well economically
but are socially more closed than African-Asians and the Chinese. The Pakistani
and Bangladeshi populations exhibit a more economically marginal position and do
display greater social distance from the majority community. The Caribbean pop-
ulation represents somewhat of a quandary. On many dimensions they are socially
assimilated (language, inter-marriage, spatial segregation) but they are economically
poor (Peach, 2005). Their assimilation seems to generate little economic payoﬀ.
Let us now describe formally the preferences of whites and non-whites, who are
all assumed to be risk neutral. Since whites are located at x =0 , the instantaneous
(indirect) utility function of a white worker of employment status j = U,E is given
by:
VWj = yj (1)
4Hostility to inter-marriage may not always be a signal of an oppositional identity. For exam-
ple, if one believes in assimilation but also believes that society is prejudiced against inter-racial
partnerships (or the children of such partnerships) one may be hostile to a close relative marrying
outwith ones own community but still in favour of mainstream culture.
5where yj is the exogenous income of a worker with employment status j (yE and
yU are respectively the wage of the employed and the unemployment beneﬁt, with
yE >y U > 0).
All nonwhites are totally identical ex ante. Thus, the instantaneous (indirect)
utility function for a non-white worker i =1 ,...,N NW of employment status j =
U,E, and “location” 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,i sg i v e nb y : 5
VNWj(xi)=yj + ex i xNW (2)
where xNW = 1
NW−1
Pj=NW−1
j=1 xj is the average or aggregate identity choice of all
nonwhite workers but i,a n de>0 the intensity of peer eﬀects. In this formulation,
non-whites deﬁne themselves with respect to whites (xi) and to their peers (xNW).6
This utility function has two parts. The ﬁr s tp a r te x p r e s s e st h ef a c tt h a tt h i s
utility increases in income yj. The second part concerns the product between own
action xi and group action xNW. The utility reaches its maximum (equal to yj +e)
if both the individual non-white and all other non-whites are not assimilated at all
(i.e. xi = xNW =1 ). It reaches its minimum (equal to yj) if either the individual
non-white or the non-white group is completely assimilated (xi =0or xNW =0 )
or both are completely assimilated (xi = xNW =0 ). The left panel of Figure 1
illustrates this utility function for diﬀerent values of xi. The right panel of Figure 1
shows diﬀerent indiﬀerence curves where utility increases when moving upward.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
One of the crucial assumptions is that utility increases in the degree of non-
assimilation of one’s ethnic group (∂VNWj/∂xNW = ex i ≥ 0). This presupposes
that non-whites have some a priori reluctance to be like whites and they would
always prefer to be as far as possible from the white’s norm and culture. This is
admittedly a strong assumption but it is adopted because we want to show that,
even with extreme negative preferences like this one, there is still some possibility
(as we will see below) that, in equilibrium, some non-whites will choose to totally
assimilate to the whites, i.e. xi =0 .I nf a c tw ew i l ls h o w( s e eP r o p o s i t i o n1b e l o w )
that, with preferences described by (2), there will always be an equilibrium with
xi = xNW =0 , for all i =1 ,...,N NW. Let us now justify why these preferences,
though extreme, are not so unrealistic.






which means that the higher the group identity eﬀort, the higher the identity eﬀort of xi.
6Even though the focus and the model are totally diﬀerent, Fershtman and Weiss (1998) have a
similar group externality that aﬀects the utility of each individual.
6First, a natural argument revolves around the transmission of preferences as for
example in Bisin et al. (2004). For example, in the United States, because African-
American history is one of slavery and discrimination, black parents may be inclined
to transmit this lack of trust for the whites to their oﬀspring (see, for example,
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, for an interesting study on trust and racial mixing).7
This may also be evident among immigrants in Europe, especially among the Muslim
community and reﬂect discrimination and hostility upon arrival. Individuals are
then a priori better oﬀ by aﬃrming their identity and to reject the white’s norm.
The ﬂipside of this is the "acting white" phenomenon, well-known by sociologists
and psychologists (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986, Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998)
and recently studied by economists (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005). If you or your
group tend to be assimilated, then your utility decreases because of peer pressure.
Second, because there are cultural and sometimes language and religious diﬀer-
ences between whites and non-whites, this utility expresses the fact that there is a
cost for non-whites in interacting with whites. In (2), for a given xNW,t h i sc o s ti s
captured indirectly through the distance xNW in social space. It is easy to see that
w h e nt h ed i s t a n c et ot h ew h i t ec o m m u n i ty increases, utility increases, reﬂecting the
disutility of interracial contacts with white “neighbors”.
Third, because peer pressures do matter, the utility of nonwhites positively de-
pends on xNW the (aggregate) choice of the other nonwhites. Indeed, for a given
xNW, the more your peers choose to distant themselves from whites, the higher is
your utility.8 Take two extreme cases. If all your peers choose to totally reject
whites’ values, i.e. xNW =1 , then your instantaneous utility is yj + ex i,s ot h a t
only your location choice is aﬀecting you. If, on the contrary, all your peers choose
to totally adopt the white’s norm, i.e. xNW =0 , then your choice does not matter
since your utility is just your income yj.A s a r e s u l t , 0 ≤ xNW ≤ 1 and thus the
choice of your peers always reduces the impact of your own choice on your utility. Of
course, the magnitude of this reduction depends on e, which can thus be interpreted
as the importance of peer eﬀects and social environment: if e is very high (it could
be greater than one), then peers have a strong eﬀect on the choice of xi. In other
words, depending on its value, e can amplify or reduce the eﬀects of the peers. There
is thus a group externality that is captured by xNW since when a worker choose xi,
he/she inﬂuences the choice of his/her peers.
To summarize, the utility function (2) captures the tension between own identity
and group identity choices, with a negative biased towards assimilation. A stated
7The movie by Spike Lee "Do the Right Thing" is a good example of this lack of trust between
black and white communities that is transmitted from one generation to another.
8In his study about religious groups, Berman (2000) has a similar externality. In his model, the
more your peers do the same activity as you, the higher is your utility (for example, praying is
much more satisfying the more participants there are). Here, what matters is the average choice of
your peers rather that the number of your peers who make the same choice.
7above, the maximum level the utility can reach is when both the individual and the
reference group choose not to assimilate, i.e. xi = xNW =1 .T h el o w e s tl e v e li tc a n
reach is when both choose to totally assimilate, i.e. xi = xNW =0 .T h i si sw h e r e
the biased is since, even if the individual and the group make the same choice, it can
lead to the lowest possible utility level because it is “wrong” to totally assimilate
to the whites (the ethnic culture will be totally lost). We strongly believe that,
for ethnic minorities, there is cultural transmission from the parents and the family
to the children that emphasizes the importance of preserving one’s own ethnicity
and to reject the dominant culture. For example, it is commonly observed that
ethnic parents disapprove interracial marriage (in Table 2, for Indians, Pakistanis
and Bangladeshis, between 27 to 36 percent will mind very much is a close relative
were to marry a white person).
Now imagine that we assume a standard “conformist” utility function where
there is cost from failing to conform to others (see, among others, Akerlof, 1980,
Akerlof, 1997, Ballester et al., 2005, Bernheim, 1994, Kandel and Lazear, 1992,
Fershtman and Weiss, 1998, Patacchini and Zenou, 2005). It is given by:
VNWj(xi)=yj + cx 2
i − d(xi − xNW)2 (3)
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a td>c>0. This condition guarantees that VNWj(xi) is strictly
concave in xi,i . e . V 00
NWj(xi) < 0. Apart from the revenue yj, this utility has two
parts. The ﬁrst one, cx 2
i, is the utility obtained by individual i from choosing identity
xi when i’s friends do not have any impact on i’s decision. The second part captures
the inﬂuence of friends’ behavior on own action. It is such that each individual
wants to minimize the social distance between him/herself and his/her reference
group, where d is the parameter describing the taste for conformity of individual
i. Observe that, in this case, utility does not necessarily increase in the degree of
non-assimilation of one’s ethnic group since ∂VNWj/∂xNW = −2d(xi−xNW),w h i c h
can be positive or negative depending on the distance in terms of identity between
i and his/her friends. At the end of section 3, we calculate the diﬀerent equilibria
with (3) and show that the results are identical to the case where the utility function
i sg i v e nb y( 2 ) .
In order to investigate further this issue of the choice of the utility function,
in Appendix B, we consider the case when someone’s utility increases the more
assimilated his/her ethnic group. We choose the following preferences:
VNWj(xi)=yj + ex i (K − xNW) (4)
where K>1. As in (2), the utility reaches its minimum when xi =0(and/or
xNW =0 ) but reaches its maximum when xi =1and xNW =0 , i.e. the individual
totally rejects the white’s norm while the group is completely assimilated. This
presupposes that there is a negative bias towards assimilation at the individual level
8(i.e. ∂VNWj/∂xi = e (K − xNW) > 0) but a positive bias at the group level (i.e.
∂VNWj/∂xNW = −ex i < 0). Observe also that
∂2VNWj
∂xi∂xNW = −e<0 ,w h i c hm e a n s
that the higher the group identity eﬀort, the lower the identity eﬀort of xi (xi and
xNW are strategic substitute).
2.2 Social networks and the job acquisition rate
Let us now describe the way the labor market operates. Here we focus on jobs that
are available to both whites and non-whites, i.e. jobs for which whites and non-
whites compete for. This means that we are not interested in self-employment and
in jobs that are only available to non-whites (because for example it implies knowing
the language of the community).
At any moment of time, workers can either be employed or unemployed. We
assume that changes in employment status (employment versus unemployment) are
governed by a continuous-time Markov process. Firms are assumed to use “local”
or informal methods so that jobs can mainly be obtained through word-of-mouth
communications (for example ﬁrms do not advertise their vacancies but transmit
the information about them only to their employed workers, who, in turn, give this
information to their “friends”). In our framework, there is a two-stage procedure
to obtain a job. First, workers must have a job contact with a ﬁrm (through their
s o c i a ln e t w o r k )a n dt h e naj o bm a t c hw i t ht h i sﬁrm (as for example in Pissarides,
2000, ch.6). The ﬁrst stage requires that unemployed workers acquire information
about jobs (this process will be detailed below) in order to establish a contact. In the
second stage, the match is automatically realized for whites, whereas it is realized
with probability m<1 for any non-white worker. This is because we assume that
there are two types of ﬁrms in the economy: non-discriminating ﬁrms (in proportion
m) and discriminating ﬁrms (in proportion 1−m). So when a non-white worker has
a contact with a ﬁrm, this job contact is transformed into a job match only if the
ﬁrm does not discriminate against non-whites. The probability 1−m can represent
the prejudices of employers who dislike associating with non-white workers (Becker,
1957). Observe that m does not depend on xi. This means that labor market
discrimination is not aﬀected by the norm that a non-white adopts. In other words,
if a non-white chooses to totally adopt the white’s culture (xi =0 ), he/she will be
seen by a discriminatory employer exactly as any other non-white that has chosen
to totally reject the white’s culture (xi =1 ).9
We assume that job contacts randomly occur at an endogenous rate θW for whites
and θi(xi) for a non-white worker located at a “distance” xi from the white’s norm
9It is easy to generalize the model by having m(xi),w i t h0 <m (xi) < 1 and m
0(xi) < 0,s ot h a t
employers discriminate more against non-whites that have chosen to distance themselves from the
white’s norm. However, this will complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results
of our main Proposition (Proposition 2 below) because the eﬀects will be even stronger.
9while the exogenous job separation rate is δ. In this context, the job acquisition
rate (that is the transition rate from unemployment to employment) is the product
of the job contact rate and the probability of a job match.S i n c e w h i t e s a l w a y s
transform a job contact into a job match, their job acquisition rate is equal to their
job contact rate θW. For non-whites, the job contact rate must be multiplied by m
(the probability that the contacted ﬁrm is not discriminating).
Let us now determine the job contact rate for all workers. For a white worker,
we have
θW = µ + λs W (5)
whereas, for a non-white worker located at a “distance” xi from the white’s norm,
it is given by:
θNW(xi)=µ + λs NW(xi) (6)
where µ>0 is the common information about jobs available to anyone (indepen-
dently of race or space), sW and sNW(xi) denote the local social network of respec-
tively whites and non-white workers located at xi,a n dλ is a positive parameter
that measures the impact of social network on the job contact rate.
In the speciﬁcation we have chosen, the job contact rate only depends on the
amount of information workers can gather about job opportunities. Formulas (5)
and (6) assume that a given level of information is available to anyone and that this
level of information may be altered through social networks. In other words, besides
the common knowledge factor, there is another way of learning about jobs: employed
workers hear about the job on the workplace and transmit this information to their
“friends”.
Let us now deﬁne what we mean by friends and social networks. The local con-
nections that whites and non-whites can use to ﬁnd a job are respectively measured
by sW and sNW(xi), which we assume to be a positive function of that group’s
employment rate, i.e. respectively 1 − uW and 1 − uNW. In other words, when
the unemployment rate is high among a particular group, individuals of that group
have few connections that can refer them to jobs and their social network is poor
(Calvó-Armengol, 2004, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou, 2005, Montgomery, 1991, Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994, Topa, 2001).
This is because, in our model, only the employed can transmit information about
jobs. In this respect, the employment rate measures the quality of a group’s social
network.
For a worker of type k = NW,W, the social network is given by (remember that
the total population is normalized to 1):
sk(xi)=α(xi)(1 − uW)NW +( 1− α(xi))(1 − uNW)NNW
with α(xi) ∈ [0,1], ∀xi,a n dα0(xi) < 0. Thus, depending on his/her position xi in
10the social space, each individual beneﬁts more or less of the social networks of all
the other workers.
For whites, since x =0 ,w eh a v e :
sW = α(0)(1 − uW)NW +( 1− α(0))(1 − uNW)NNW
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that
α(xi)=1− xi (7)
which implies that α(0) = 1 and α(1) = 0.A sar e s u l t ,t h ew h i t e ’ ss o c i a ln e t w o r ki s
given by:
sW =( 1− uW)NW (8)
which means that their social network only depends on their own employment rate.
For non-whites, the social network will partly depend on their location in the
social space. Indeed, non-whites beneﬁt from their own connections to jobs (i.e.
their own employment rate) and also from part of the social network of whites. We
have:10
sNW(xi)=( 1− xi)(1 − uW)NW + xi(1 − uNW)NNW (9)
The following comments on (9) are in order. First, sNW(xi) explicitly takes into
account the underlying population shares of whites and nonwhites and thus gives a
weighted average measure of social distance. Second, two diﬀerent social networks
aﬀect the social network of non-white workers: the white’s social network, 1 − uW,
and the non-white’s one, 1 − uNW. The relative weight of each of them strongly
depends on the choice of xi in the social space.
The general idea here is that, the more time one spends with the white com-
munity, the less time he/she spends with his/her own community. In a spatial
context, this will be even more true since non-whites living in predominately non-
white (white) neighborhoods will (not) interact very much with other non-whites
because of the physical separation between communities. What is crucial here is
that there is an externality of being “close” to whites. This externality causes the
employment rate of non-whites to be positively aﬀected by the employment rate
of whites. However, depending on the value of xi (the willingness to interact with
whites or to adopt the white’s culture), non-whites can beneﬁtm o r eo rl e s sf r o m
whites’ connections to jobs.
If, as we will see below, whites have the best connections to jobs (because there
are less discriminated against since most of the employers, both in the UK and the
US and elsewhere, are whites), then equations (8) and (9) capture the fact that
10Observe that the social network of an individual of type i here depends both explicitly on
his/her own identity choice xi and implicitly on the indentity choice of other co-ethnics through
uNW, which is, as we will see below, a function of x (see equation (15) below) .
11there is a cost (in terms of labor market outcomes) to live in a predominantly white
society and not willing to adopt the white’s norm (i.e. being oppositional).
3 The (two-stage) equilibrium
As stated above, there are two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, non-white workers choose
their location x in the social space (we have imposed the location x =0for whites).
In the second stage, the labor market outcomes (i.e. the unemployment rate and the
probability to ﬁnd a job) of each white and each non-white are determined. Because
of backward induction, we solve the second stage ﬁrst.
We have seen that changes in the employment status of white and non-white
workers are governed by a time continuous Markov process in which θW and mθNW(x)11
are respectively the group-speciﬁc transition rate (deﬁn e db y( 5 )a n d( 6 ) )a n dδ is
the job destruction rate. As a result, plugging (8) in (5), the probability to ﬁnd a
job for whites is equal to
θW = µ + λ(1 − uW)NW (10)
whereas, for non-whites, by plugging (9) in (6) and using (7), it is given by:
mθNW(x)=µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + x(1 − uNW)NNW] (11)
Since each job is destroyed according to a Markov process with arrival rate
δ, then the number of workers of type k = NW,W who enter unemployment is
δ(1 − uk)Nk and the number who leave unemployment is mkθkukNk,w i t hmW =1
and mNW = m<1. The evolution of unemployment is thus given by the diﬀerence
between these two ﬂows,
•
(ukNk)=δ(1 − uk)Nk − mkθk ukNk ,k = NW,W (12)
where
•
(ukNk) is the variation of unemployment with respect to time for workers of
type k. In steady state, the level of unemployment is constant and therefore these





,k = NW,W (13)





11When there is no possible confusion, we will omit the index i for x.





where uNW(x) denotes the unemployment rate of non-white workers as a function
of x the location in the social space.
Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that we have uW <u NW whatever the location
chosen in the ﬁrst stage by non-whites. Lemma 2 in the Appendix shows that when
µ>λ , the solutions of (14) and (15) are unique, strictly positive, strictly between 0
and 1, and respectively given by (18), (19) and (20).
Let us now solve the ﬁrst stage of the model. We can now calculate the expected
utilities of each group. To do that, we assume perfect capital markets with a zero
interest rate,12 which enable workers to smooth their income over time as they enter
and leave unemployment: workers save while employed and draw down on their
savings when out of work. At any moment, the disposable income of a worker is
thus equal to that worker’s average income over the job cycle. Therefore, using (1),
the expected utility of a white worker is equal to
EVW =( 1 − uW)VWE + uWVWU (16)
= yE − uW(yE − yU)
For a non-white worker i located in xi,u s i n g( 2 ) ,i ti sg i v e nb y :
EVNW(xi)=( 1 − uNW(xi))VNWE(xi)+uNW(xi)VNWU(xi) (17)
= yE + ex i xNW − uNW(xi)(yE − yU)
where uNW(xi) is determined by (15).
We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria such that all agents choose the
same x.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition:






(i) The choice x∗
NW of each nonwhite maximizes his/her expected utility EVNW(x)
anticipating the resulting labor market outcomes and taking as given the ag-
gregate choice of all other nonwhites x∗
NW.
12When there is a zero interest rate, workers have no intrinsic preference for the present so that
they only care about the fraction of time they spend employed and unemployed. Therefore, the
expected utilities are not state dependent. For example, since a white worker spends a fraction





θW +δyU. The same analysis applies for non-whites.
13(ii) The aggregate choice of all nonwhites x∗
NW is consistent with the optimal
choices of all nonwhites. Speciﬁcally, x∗
NW = x∗
NW.
(iii) The unemployment rates of whites and nonwhites are determined by the steady-
state conditions (14) and (15).
We can now fully characterize the steady-state labor market equilibrium. We
have our ﬁrst straightforward result:
Proposition 1 Assume µ>λ . Then whatever the values of all other parameters,
there always exists a steady-state equilibrium in which all nonwhite workers choose
to totally adopt the white’s norm, i.e. x∗
NW = x∗
NW =0 . Their unemployment rate
uSS ≡ u(0) is given by (19).
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition of (17) is given by:
∂EVNW(xi)
∂xi





i) > 0 (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Assume that x−i =0 ,t h e n
the optimal choice for i is x∗
i =0since
∂EVNW(xi)
∂xi < 0. Thus, all workers coordinate
themselves on this equilibrium and no one has the incentive to deviate.
This result is very intuitive. When workers choose xNW they trade oﬀ the gains
(higher chance to get a job) with the costs of being close to x (depending on the
choice of the others). Now, if all your peers decide to totally adopt the white’s norm,
it is clear that you will also make the same choice since there are only gains from
it (higher chance to get a job and positive externality from the group). Let us now
give our general result.
Proposition 2 Assume µ>λ . By using the value of u0(0) and u0(1) in (25) and
(26), we have:
(i) If e/(yE−yU) <u 0(0), there is a unique stable steady-state equilibrium in which
all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the white’s norm, i.e. x∗
NW =0
(Figure 1).
(ii) If u0(0) <e / (yE − yU) <u 0(1), generically two cases may arise:
(iia) if u0(0) is large enough, there is a unique stable steady-state equilibrium
in which all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the white’s norm,
i.e. x∗
NW =0(Figure 2).
14(iib) if u0(0) is small enough, there are three stable steady-state equilibria (Fig-
ure 3). In the ﬁrst one, all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the
white’s norm, i.e. x∗
NW =0 . In the second one, all nonwhite workers
choose to partially adopt the white’s norm, i.e. 0 <x ∗
NW < 1 but the
value of x∗
NW is quite low. Their unemployment rate uIN ≡ uNW(x∗
NW)
is given by (21). In the third one, all nonwhite workers choose to partially
adopt the white’s norm, i.e. 0 < x∗




NW < 1. Their unemployment rate uIN ≡ uNW(x∗
NW) is
given by (21).
(iii) If e/(yE −yU) >u 0(1), there are three stable steady-state equilibria (Figure 4).
In the ﬁrst one, all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the white’s norm,
i.e. x∗
NW =0 . In the second one, all nonwhite workers choose to totally reject
the white’s norm, i.e. x∗
NW =1 . Their unemployment rate uCO ≡ u(1) is
given by (20). In the third equilibrium, all nonwhite workers choose to partially
adopt the white’s norm, i.e. 0 < b x∗
NW < 1,w i t hx∗
NW < b x∗
NW < x∗
NW.T h e i r
unemployment rate b uIN ≡ uNW(b x∗
NW) is given by (21).
T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eo fw h i t e suW is given by (18). We also have that:
uW <u SS <u IN < b uIN < uIN <u CO
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figures 2a-2d illustrate the diﬀerent cases. This proposition shows that ex ante
identical workers can end up choosing oppositional identities. For example, in case
(iii), for exactly the same parameter values, all workers can choose either to totally
reject the white’s norm (x∗
NW =1 ) or to totally assimilate to it (x∗
NW =0 ). There
is a coordination problem in which the group pressure creates externalities in such
a way that workers choose oppositional identities. Of course, our results depend on
the value of e (the intensity of peer pressure), the wage premium of being employed,
yE−yU, and the marginal impact of x on the nonwhite unemployment rate u0
NW(x).
To be more precise, there are two forces that counteract each other. On the one
hand, non-whites would like to reject the white’s norm because it is costly to interact
with whites, but, on the other, they are attracted to whites because of the positive
consequences in the labor market. Now depending on the choices of the peers, one
force can dominate the other.
Proposition 2, case (i) (Figure 2a), shows that if there are low peer pressures
(low e), the payoﬀs to interact with whites are very high and discrimination m is not
too strong (high (yE − yU)u0(0)), then all workers will choose to assimilate to the
white culture x∗
NW =0 . It is clear in this case that no worker will deviate from this
equilibrium because the gains are very high and there is basically no cost since the
group provides very positive externalities. In terms of the ethnic groups discussed
15e a r l i e r ,t h eA f r i c a n - A s i a n sa n dt h eC h i n e s ea r em o r el i k e l yt ob ei nt h i st y p eo f
equilibrium (they are economically successful and socially well assimilated) (Peach,
1996).
At the other extreme, Proposition 2, case (iii) (Figure 2d), shows that if there are
strong peer pressures, low rewards to interact with whites and high discrimination,
then there are two other equilibria in which all workers will choose to either totally
or partially reject the white’s norm. This means that, even if it implies a penalty
in terms of ﬁnding a job, because of strong peer pressures nonwhites reject the
white’s norm by choosing a x∗
NW diﬀerent to zero. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi
population since they display greater social distance from the majority community
and are economically disadvantaged would seem to be consistent with those who
choose x∗
NW =1(Heath, 2001).
Finally, in the intermediate case where peer pressures and payoﬀst oi n t e r a c t
with whites have intermediate values (Proposition 2, cases (iia) and (iib),F i g u r e s
2b and 2c), other equilibria can emerge in which nonwhites either partially or totally
adopt the white’s norm. In this case, they will never totally reject the white’s norm
because the rewards are not too low. The Indian population which has done well
economically but is socially more closed than the African-Asians and the Chinese
would seem to ﬁt with this intermediate case. The Caribbean population is more
diﬃcult to place. In terms of language ﬂuency, inter-marriage and geographical
location they are more socially assimilated but still they are economically poor
(Peach, 2005).
[Insert Figures 2a,2b,2ca n d2d]
An interesting result is that, even if all individuals in a community would like
to reject the white’s norm (i.e. x∗
NW =1 ), it is not always an equilibrium. In
fact, it has to be that peer pressures and discrimination are suﬃciently strong and
the rewards from interacting with whites suﬃciently low (case (iib)). Otherwise,
individuals cannot coordinate themselves on this equilibrium in which everybody
chooses x∗
NW =1 .
Throughout language and also religion play a role in deﬁning and diﬀerentiating
individuals. As a result, Proposition 2 indicates that non-whites who have diﬀerent
language and religion than that of the majority group (whites) and are strongly
attached to them (strong peer pressures) can totally reject the white’s norm and
are thus more likely to experience adverse labor outcomes. There is an important
literature that shows that the lack of ﬂuency in the English language has indeed
adverse eﬀects on both assimilation and labor market outcomes of non-white workers
(especially immigrants). This literature begins with Chiswick (1978) and has been
studied further by, among others, McManus et al. (1983) and Borjas (1994) for
the US, and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for the UK. Indeed, the Dustmann and
Fabbri (2003) study ﬁnds that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK do have
16a lower level of language ﬂuency compared to other ethnic groups. Concerning
religion, there is a small literature on the economic consequences of religion (see in
particular Iannaccone, 1998) but, to our knowledge, not on the impact of religion
on the degree of assimilation and labor market outcomes of immigrants. A notable
exception is Lazear (1999) who focuses on cultural diﬀerences (religion is obviously
part of the culture of people) between the minority and the majority group. He
shows that individuals from minority groups are more likely to adopt the culture of
the majority when the minority group accounts for a small proportion of the total
population.
It is now interesting to investigate the case of “conformist” preferences given by
(3) with d>c>0. In fact, by focusing on symmetric equilibria (xi = xNW)a n d
observing that Lemmata 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are still valid, and by replacing e by 2c in
the proof of Proposition 2, so that g(x) ≡ 2c
yE−yU x,w ee x a c t l yo b t a i nP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
There is still a negative bias towards assimilation since, in a symmetric equilibrium,
∂VNWj/∂xi =2 cxi > 0, so that the less someone is assimilated, the better oﬀ he/she
is. Observe that multiple equilibria emerge mainly because xi and xNW are strategic
complement (∂2VNWj/∂xi∂xNW > 0).
In the opposite case when the utility function is given by (4), that is when some-
one’s utility increases the more assimilated his/her ethnic group, the equilibrium
results are summarized in Proposition 3 in Appendix B. It is easy to see that the
results are qualitatively the same since the trade oﬀ between the marginal gain from
the white’s social network and the cost to assimilate determines which type of equi-
librium prevails. There is however a major diﬀerence: there are no more multiple
equilibria, i.e. for the same parameter values, only a unique equilibrium prevails. In
words, for the same observables, individuals do not choose “oppositional” identities.
This is due to the speciﬁcation of (4) because there is a tension between own (xi)
and group choice (xNW) of identity since an increase in xi increases utility while an
increase in xNW reduces utility. To be more precise, there are no more multiple equi-
libria because xi and xNW are now strategic substitute (∂2VNWj/∂xi∂xNW < 0).
Vives (1999) and Ballester et al. (2005) discuss the relationship between strategic
complementarity/substituability and multiple/unique equilibrium.
More generally, our model shows that, in equilibrium, whites and those who
choose x∗
NW =1are in general respectively the most and the least favored group in
terms of labor market outcomes. Indeed, whites are not discriminated against and
thus beneﬁt from a good social network. To the contrary, those who choose x∗
NW =
1 have a poor social network (in particular because they do not like to interact
with whites) and are discriminated against. Therefore, they have the worst labor
market outcomes because unemployment is rampant and peer pressure (to conform
to the community’s norms and accept adverse racial preferences) has negative eﬀects
on those who are sensitive to it. These results are partly based on the fact that
17information about jobs can only be acquired through social networks (employed
friends). In this respect, these individuals are totally isolated from jobs and thus
have little information on job opportunities. The situation is diﬀerent for those who
choose x∗
NW =0since they are less isolated from jobs because they have contacts
with whites.
Of course, we cannot rank (expected) utilities since, for example, individuals who
experience high unemployment rates can be quite “happy” since they do not interact
very much with whites. The basic message here is that those who totally reject the
white’s culture “pay” in some sense the price of this behavior by experiencing high
unemployment rates and a low probability to ﬁnd a job compared to the other
ethnic minorities who are more willing to adopt the white’s norm. However, this
does not imply that they are worse oﬀ. To see this, let us compare individuals with
oppositional identities, i.e. those who choose x∗
NW =0and x∗
NW =1 . Using (17),
we have:
EVNW(0) R EVNW(1) ⇔
e
yE − yU
Q u(1) − u(0)
since u(1) >u (0). For example, when e/(yE − yU) >u 0(1),P r o p o s i t i o n2s h o w s
that both equilibria (x∗
NW =0and x∗
NW =1 ) occur and we cannot Pareto-rank
them. If, for example, u0(1) <e / (yE − yU) <u (1) − u(0), those who completely
assimilate to the whites (x∗
NW =0 ) will be better oﬀ whereas if e/(yE − yU) >
max{u0(1),u(1) − u(0)}, then those who totally reject the white’s norm (x∗
NW =1 )
will be happier.
This model has also some interesting implications in terms family and peer pres-
sures as well as welfare policies. In particular, there is an interesting externality
generated by a non-white choosing to locate closer to the white norm. By doing
so, he/she not only enjoys a higher probability of employment for him/herself, but
he/she establishes a link between the white and non-white job networks. This has no
eﬀect on the rate of employment among whites, but will positively inﬂuence the prob-
ability of employment among non-whites. For the usual reasons, therefore, adoption
of white identities will be underprovided. The model also suggests that, other things
being equal, government guaranteed jobs (or income) should generate higher vari-
ance in identity choices. This is a particularly provocative result in light of the
political debate concerning the possibility of “cultures” of aid dependence. Indeed,
exogenous increases (decreases) in unemployment insurance should be associated
with increases (decreases) in oppositional identity choices among minorities because
there is less incentive to interact with whites. In particular, if the unemployment
beneﬁt yU is very low, then there is no equilibrium in which all nonwhites totally
reject the white’s norm. If, on the contrary yU is very large, then this possibility is
much more likely to arise.
184C o n c l u s i o n
Social unrest in Northern cities in England in 2001, September the 11th and the
July 2005 London bombings have all placed the issue of ethnic identity and the no-
tion of “Britishness” at the forefront of political debate in the UK with equivalent
debates occurring in a number of other European countries (see Buruma, 2004 and
Telvick, 2005). An important theme that emerges is the idea that some individuals
are seen to reject the dominant society’s values and that there may be a trade-
oﬀ between identiﬁcation with one’s own ethnic or religious group and social and
economic advance. Though such frameworks have been utilized to explain racial
diﬀerences in school performance in the US (Ogbu, 1978; Fordham and Ogbu, 1986;
Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998) the relationship between oppositional identi-
ties and the labor market remains relatively unexplored. Apart from a few notable
studies (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005) most of what is written on the subject seems
at best a plead for further research (Heath, 2001).
This paper examines at a theoretical level the relationship between oppositional
identities amongst ethnic groups and employment in the labor market. In our theo-
retical model ethnic preferences are predicted to reduce labor market success where
preferences are gauged in terms of remoteness or otherwise to white norms. Non-
white individuals in our model are deﬁned with respect to their social environment
and their attachments to their culture of origin and jobs are mainly found through
social networks. Contingent on the strength of peer pressures, non-whites choose to
adopt “oppositional” identities since some individuals may identify with the domi-
nant culture and others may reject that culture, even if it implies unfavorable labor
market outcomes. Empirical research on this issue remains limited and this we
pursue in future research.
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22APPENDIX A: Proof of the propositions
Lemma 1 Whatever the location 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 chosen by non-whites, the unemploy-
ment rate of whites is always lower than that of non-whites, i.e.
uW <u NW
Proof. This is obvious since all whites are located in x =0a n dt h e ya r en o t
discriminated against. So even if non-whites choose the “best” location in terms of
labor market outcomes, i.e. x =0 , they will still experience a higher unemployment
rate because of labor discrimination.
Lemma 2 Assume µ>λ .T h e n
(i) The unemployment rate of whites is uniquely determined, strictly positive,
strictly between 0 and 1 and is given by:
uW =
δ + µ + λNW −
p
(δ + µ + λNW)2 − 4λNWδ
2λNW
(18)
(ii) For non-whites, we have:
(iia) When x =0 , the unemployment rate of non-whites is uniquely deter-
mined, strictly positive, strictly between 0 and 1 and is given by:
u(0) ≡ uNW(0) =
δ
δ + µm + λm(1 − uW)NW
(19)
(iib) When x =1 , the unemployment rate of non-whites is uniquely deter-
mined, strictly positive, strictly between 0 and 1 and is equal to:
u(1) ≡ uNW(1) =
δ +( µ + λNW)m −
q




(iic) When 0 <x<1, the unemployment rate of non-whites is uniquely deter-
mined, strictly positive, strictly between 0 and 1 and is given by:
uNW(x)=






∆ =[ δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]]
2 − 4δNNWλmx > 0
23Proof. (i) The unemployment rate of whites is deﬁned by (14), which is equivalent
to:
λNWu2
W − (δ + µ + λNW)uW + δ =0 (22)
The discriminant is ∆W =( δ + µ + λNW)2 − 4λNWδ.I fµ>λ ,t h e n∆W > 0.W e
thus have two distinct roots that are given by
uW =
δ + µ + λNW ±
p
(δ + µ + λNW)2 − 4λNWδ
2λNW
and both of them are strictly positive. Let us show that the root with the highest
value is strictly greater than 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
δ + µ +
p
(δ + µ + λNW)2 − 4λNWδ>λ N W
w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u ea ss o o na sµ>λ(since NW < 1). Let us show that the root
with the lowest value is strictly less than 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
δ + µ − λNW <
p
(δ + µ + λNW)2 − 4λNWδ
or
4λNWδ<(δ + µ + λNW)2 − (δ + µ − λNW)2
⇔ µ>0
We have thus shown that there is a unique uW such that 0 <u W < 1 and it is given
by (18).
L e tu sn o wf o c u so nuNW, the unemployment rate of nonwhites, which is deﬁned
by (15). Diﬀerent cases must be considered.
(iia) When x =0 , (15) reduces to
[δ + µm + λm(1 − uW)NW]uNW(0) − δ =0
By solving these equations, we obtain
uNW(0) =
δ
δ + µm + λm(1 − uW)NW
> 0
It is obvious that uNW(0) is less than 1 since δ<δ+ µm + λm(1 − uW)NW.
We have thus shown that, when x =0 , there is a unique uNW such that 0 <
uNW(0) < 1 and it is given by (19).
(iib) When x =1 , (15) reduce to
λNNWmu 2
NW(1) − [δ +( µ + λNNW)m]uNW(1) + δ =0
The discriminant is given by ∆NW(1) = [δ +( µ + λNNW)m]
2−4λNWmδ.I ti se a s y
to verify that if µ>λ ,t h e n∆NW > 0. W et h u sh a v et w od i s t i n c tr o o t st h a ta r e
given by
uNW(1) =
δ +( µ + λNW)m ±
q
[δ +( µ + λNW)m]
2 − 4λmδNW
2λNWm
24and both of them are strictly positive. Let us show that the root with the highest
value is strictly greater than 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
δ +( µ + λNW)m +
q
[δ +( µ + λNW)m]
2 − 4λNWmδ > 2λNWm
w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u ea ss o o na sµ>λ . Let us show that the root with the lowest
value is strictly less than 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
δ +( µ + λNW)m −
q
[δ +( µ + λNW)m]
2 − 4λNWmδ < 2λNWm
or
(δ + µm − λNWm)
2 < [δ +( µ + λNW)m]
2 − 4λNWmδ
⇔ µm > 0
We have thus shown that, when x =1 , there is a unique uNW such that 0 <
uNW(1) < 1 and it is given by (20).
(iic) When 0 <x<1, (15) reduces to:
λNNWmxu2
NW−[δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]]uNW+δ =0 (23)
The discriminant of this equation is given by:
∆ =[ δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]]
2 − 4δNNWλmx
Let us check that it is positive. This is equivalent to:




2 + λ2m2 [(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]
2
+2(δ + µm)λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW] > 4δλNNWmx
or
δ2 + µ2m2 +2 δµm+ λ2m2 [(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]
2
+2µλm2 [(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]+2δλm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW] > 2δλNNWmx
⇔ δ2 + µ2m2 + λ2m2 [(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]
2
+2µλm2 [(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]+2 δλm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW]
+2δm(µ − λNNWx) > 0
This last inequality is always true since µ>λ N NWx because NNW < 1, x<1 and
µ>λ .T h u s∆ > 0. As a result, we have two distinct roots that are given by:
uNW(x)=




25and both of them are strictly positive. Let us show that the root with the highest
value is strictly greater than 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o




δ + m(µ − λNNWx)+λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW]+
√
∆ > 0
w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u eb e c a u s eNNW < 1, x<1 and µ>λ . Let us now show that the
root with the lowest value is strictly less than 1.W eh a v e :
δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW] −
√
∆ < 2λNNWmx
which, using the value of ∆, is equivalent to (taking the square on both sides):
λNNWmx − δ +
√
∆ > 0
Then, taking again the square on both sides gives and using the value of ∆:
[δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]]
2 >δ 2 +λ2N2
NWm2x2 +2δλNNWmx
which is equivalent to:
[δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW]]
2 > (δ + λNNWmx)
2
or
m(µ − λNNWx)+λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW] > 0
This last inequality is again always true because NNW < 1, x<1 and µ>λ .
We have thus shown that, when 0 <x<1, there is a unique uNW(x) such that
0 <u NW(x) < 1 and it is given by (21).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Before proving this proposition, we need the following three Lemmata.
Lemma 3 Assume µ>λ . The function uNW(x) is strictly increasing with x on the
interval [u(0),u(1)],w h e r e0 <u (0) < 1 and 0 <u (1) < 1 are respectively deﬁned









where D(x) ≡ δ + µm + λm[(1 − x)(1− uW)NW + xNNW] − 2λNNWmxuNW(x).
26Proof. By totally diﬀerentiating (23), we obtain (24). Furthermore, using Lemma
1a n dt h ef a c tt h a tNW >N NW, the numerator of (24) is clearly strictly positive.
Finally, the denominator D(x) of (24) can be rewritten as
D(x)=δ+m(µ − λNNWxuNW(x))+λm(1 − x)(1−uW)NW+λNNWmx(1 − uNW(x))
Since µ>λ ,a n dx, NNW and uNW are all less than 1,t h e nm(µ − λNNWxuNW(x)) >
0. As a result, the denominator D(x) is strictly positive and ∂uNW(x)/∂x > 0.
Lemma 4 Assume µ>λ .T h e n , t h e f u n c t i o n u0
NW(x) is strictly increasing and
convex on the interval [u0(0),u 0(1)],w h e r eu0(0) and u0(1) have both ﬁnite values and
are respectively given by
u0(0) ≡ u0
NW(0) =
λmu(0)[(1 − uW)NW − (1 − u(0))NNW]




λmu(1)[(1 − uW)NW − (1 − u(1))NNW]
δ + µm + λNNWm(1 − 2u(1))
> 0 (26)
where uW, u(0) and u(1) are respectively deﬁned by (18), (19) and (20).





λmu0AD(x)+λ2m2uNW(x)[(1− uW)NW − (1 − uNW(x))NNW](A +2 NNWxu 0)
D(x)2
where u0 ≡ u0
NW(x) and
A ≡ [(1 − uW)NW − (1 − 2uNW(x))NNW] > 0
which is clearly strictly positive using Lemma 1 and the fact that NW >N NW.A s
a result, since D(x) > 0 and u0 > 0 by Lemma 3, then u00
NW(x) > 0.
This shows that u0
NW(x) is strictly increasing. To calculate the values of u0(0)
and u0(1), it remains to respectively plug the value x =0and x =1in (24) and
we easily obtain (25) and (26). Finally, let us show that u0(0) and u0(1) have both
ﬁnite values. Since u0(0) <u 0(1),i ts u ﬃces to show that u0(1) is bounded above. In
fact, it is easy to see that u0(1) < 1/[(1 − u(1))NNW]. Indeed, this rewrites
λmu(1)[(1 − uW)NW − (1 − u(1))NNW]





λmu(1)(1 − uW)NW <
δ + µm − λNNWmu(1)
(1 − u(1))NNW
+ λm + λmu(1)(1 − u(1))NNW
27Since µ>λimplies that µm − λNNWmu(1),i ts u ﬃces to show that
λmu(1)(1 − uW)NW <λ m
which is always true because u(1)(1 − uW)NW < 1. This implies that u0(1) has a
ﬁnite value and thus both u0(0) and u0(1) have ﬁnite values.
Let us now show that the function u0








NW [(1 − uW)NW − (1 − uNW)NNW]+uNW u0
NWNNW
¤¡
A +2 NNWxu 0
NW
¢










λmuNW [(1 − uW)NW − (1 − uNW)NNW]
¡




where D ≡ D(x) is deﬁned in Lemma 3. By denoting by Z ≡ (1 − uW)NW −




u0Z + uu 0NNW
¤¡




DA0 − 2λmA +2 NNWu0D − 4NNWu0λmxD0¤
The ﬁrst two terms are positive, thus let us show that the last term DA0 −2λmA+
2NNWu0D − 4NNWu0λmxD0 is positive. Observe that
D0 = −2mλNNWxu0
NW(x) − mλ[(1 − uW)NW − NNW] < 0
and thus all terms are positive but −2λmA < 0.S i n c ew eh a v e :
2λmA =2 λm[(1 − uW)NW − (1 − 2uNW(x))NNW]








u0¢2 λ2m2x2 +4 NNWu0λ2m2x[(1 − uW)NW − NNW]
it is easy to show that, in the interval [u0(0),u 0(1)], DA0 − 2λmA +2 NNWu0D −
4NNWu0λmxD0 is strictly positive and thus u000
NW(x) > 0.
Lemma 5 The expected utility function EVNW(xi) is strictly concave on [0,1].
28Proof. The expected utility function EVNW(xi) is given by:
EVNW(xi)=yE + ex ixNW − uNW(xi)(yE − yU)
By diﬀerentiating twice this function, we easily obtain:
∂2EVNW(xi)
∂x2 = −u00
NW(xi)(yE − yU) < 0
which is strictly negative since, in Lemma 4, we have shown that u00
NW(x),d e ﬁned
by (27), is strictly positive.
Let us now prove Proposition 2.
The ﬁrst order condition for non-whites is given by:
∂EVNW(xi)
∂xi
= exNW − u0
NW(xi)(yE − yU)=0
We focus on symmetric equilibria. Thus xNW = xi = x∗
NW.T h i sﬁrst order condi-





We have to study this equation. Let us denote g(x) ≡ e
yE−yU x. Then this equation





We know from Lemma 4 that u0
NW(x) is strictly increasing on the interval
[u0(0),u 0(1)],w h e r eu0(0) and u0(1) are both strictly positive and have ﬁnite val-
ues. Moreover, it easy to see that g(·) is a line with a positive slope of e
yE−yU and
with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = e
yE−yU .
(i) Consider ﬁrst the case when e/(yE − yU) <u 0(0). Then it is clear that
u0
NW(xNW) >g (xNW),∀xNW ∈ [0,1] and thus ∂EVNW(x)/∂x < 0.A sar e s u l t ,t h e
only possible equilibrium is when all workers choose x∗
NW =0 . It is obvious that no
other equilibrium can exist since, in this case, worker i will always deviate to choose
x∗
NW =0(see Figure 1). In this case, the unemployment rate of all non-whites is
u(0) ≡ uNW(0) and is given by (19).
(iii) Consider now the other extreme case when e/(yE − yU) >u 0(1).F r o m
Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium when all workers choose x∗
NW =0
exists. There is clearly another equilibrium in which all workers choose x∗
NW =1 .
Indeed, if x∗
NW =1 , then the ﬁrst order condition writes: e −u0
NW(1)(yE −yU)=0 .
Thus if e/(yE − yU) ≥ u0(1),w eh a v et h a t∂EVNW(x)/∂x > 0, ∀x ∈ [0,1].A s a
result, all workers choose x∗
NW =1 . Their unemployment rate u(1) ≡ uNW(1) is
29given by (20). Can we have another equilibrium in which 0 <x ∗
NW < 1?T h ea n s w e r
is yes. Indeed, we have that u0(0) > 0 and that g(1) >u 0(1). Since the functions
g(·) and u0(·) are both continuous and increasing in x, they have to intersect only
once at x between 0 and 1. There is thus another equilibrium in which all workers
choose a unique 0 < b x∗
NW < 1. Their unemployment rate is given by (21). Figure 4
illustrates this case.
(ii) Consider the intermediate case when u0(0) <e / (yE − yU) <u 0(1).F r o m
Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium when all workers choose x∗
NW =0
exists. Is it possible to have an equilibrium in which all workers choose x∗
NW =1 ?I f
this is the case, the ﬁrst order condition for i is: e−u0(1)(yE −yU),w h i c hi sa l w a y s
negative so that the best reply for i is to choose x∗
NW =0 . Thus an equilibrium
in which all workers choose x∗
NW =1cannot exist in this case. Consider thus
symmetric equilibria in which all workers choose 0 <x ∗
NW < 1. Generically, two
cases may then arise. Case (iia) Either the curve u0(x) is always above the line g(x)
(see Figure 2) ∀x ∈ [0,1].T h i si st r u ei su0(0) is large enough. In this case, the only
equilibrium is that all workers choose x∗
NW =0 .C a s e(iib) Or the curve u0(x) cuts
the line g(x) twice at 0 <x ∗
NW < 1 and 0 < x∗
NW < 1 (see Figure 3). 13 This is
true is u0(0) is small enough. We thus have two equilibria in which in one case all
workers choose x∗
NW and in the other they all choose x∗
NW. It should be clear that if
all workers choose for example x∗
NW then this is an equilibrium since no worker will
deviate because at x∗
NW his/her expected utility is maximum. In both equilibria,
their unemployment rate is given by (21) with diﬀerent values when x = x∗
NW and
when x = x∗
NW.I ti sﬁn a l l ye a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tb x∗
NW deﬁned above in case (iii) is
such that x∗
NW < b x∗
NW < x∗
NW.
Let us now show that each equilibrium is stable. Basically, the only variable that
is dynamic is the unemployment rate. The equation of evolution of unemployment
is given by (12), which we can be written as:
•
uk = δ(1 − uk) − mkθk uk ,k = NW,W
By solving this diﬀerential equation, we easily obtain:
u(t)=e x p{−[δ + mkθk]t} + u∗
k
where u∗










13There is also another case when the curve u
0(x) cuts the line g(x) only once. We ignore this
case since this happens on a set of measure zero.
30As a result, the equation for the evolution of unemployment (12) is stable, i.e. for
any given initial condition it always converges to its steady state value, and thus,
for each regime, the steady-state equilibrium is also stable.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that
uW <u SS <u IN < b uIN < uIN <u CO
since, by Lemma 1, the unemployment rate of whites uW is always lower than
any unemployment rate of nonwhites and the only diﬀerence between nonwhites’
unemployment rates is the contact with whites through 1 − uW.
31APPENDIX B: An alternative formulation
The utility function is given by (4), that is:
VNWj(xi)=yj + ex i (K − xNW)
where K>1, and thus




= e (K − xNW) − u0
NW(xi)(yE − yU)
First, observe that Proposition 1 is not true anymore so that there not always exists
a steady-state equilibrium in which all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the
white’s norm, i.e. x∗
NW = x∗
NW =0 . Using the same proof as for Proposition 2 and




we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume µ>λ . If the utility is described by (4), then we have:
(i) If eK/(yE −yU) ≤ u0(0), there is a unique symmetric stable steady-state equi-
librium in which all nonwhite workers choose to totally adopt the white’s norm,
i.e. x∗
NW = x∗
NW =0 . Their unemployment rate uSS ≡ u(0) is given by (19).
(ii) If e(K − 1)/(yE − yU) <u 0(1), there is a unique symmetric stable steady-
state equilibrium in which all nonwhite workers choose to partially adopt the
white’s norm, i.e. 0 <x ∗
NW = x∗
NW < 1. Their unemployment rate b uNW ≡
uNW(x∗
NW) is given by (21).
(iii) If e(K − 1)/(yE−yU) ≥ u0(1), there is a unique symmetric stable steady-state
equilibrium in which all nonwhite workers choose to totally reject the white’s
norm, i.e. x∗
NW = x∗
NW =1 . Their unemployment rate uCO ≡ u(1) is given
by (20).
T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eo fw h i t e suW is given by (18). We also have that:
uW <u SS < b uNW <u CO
32NWj V
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Figure 1: Utility and group externalities for VNMj = yj + ex i xNWFigure 2a: Case (i) when e/(yE − yU) <u 0(0)
33Figure 2b: Case (iia) when u0(0) <e / (yE − yU) <u 0(1) and u0(0) is large enough
34Figure 2c: Case (iib) when u0(0) <e / (yE − yU) <u 0(1) and u0(0) is small enough
35Figure 2d: Case (iii) when e/(yE − yU) >u 0(1)
36Table 1: In many ways I think of myself as British (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian African
Asian
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
Strongly agree  20.09  13.98 25.79 22.53 14.23  10.00
Agree 37.77  43.69 45.28 37.55 41.90  38.00
Neither 8.30  13.40 10.69 16.21 20.55  11.00
Disagree 24.02  23.30 16.04 15.22 18.58  33.00
Strongly 
disagree 
9.83 5.63 2.20 8.50 4.74  8.00
N 458  515 318 506 253  100
 
 
Table 2: If a close relative were to marry a white person (%) 
 
 Caribbean Indian African
Asian
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
Would not mind  82.43 51.87 66.25 38.61 49.60  84.69
Mind a little  6.51 10.02 11.04 11.09 9.20  6.12
Mind very much  8.24 27.89 13.56 36.83 33.20  7.14
Can’t say  2.82 10.22 9.15 13.47 8.00  2.05
N 461 509 317 505 250  98
 
Table 3: How important is ethnicity in choosing a school? (%) 
 
 Caribbean Indian African
Asian
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
Very important  15.94 6.81 8.44  12.06 16.21  3.03
Fairly important  20.74 16.15 15.31 16.60 18.58  7.07
Not very important  16.16 13.42 10.31 15.02 16.21  15.15
No influence  44.32 57.78 59.06 47.23 38.34  73.74
Can’t say  2.84 5.84 6.88 9.09 10.67  1.01
N 458 514 320 506 253  99
 
Table 4: What proportion of one’s ethnic group would you like in your children’s 
school? (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian African 
Asian
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
Fewer than half  16.67  11.07 14.42 9.49 14.17  23.23
About half  35.06  18.83 20.06 28.06 30.31  7.07
More than half  4.11  1.55 1.57 5.14 5.12  1.01
No preference  40.69  63.11 56.11 48.62 40.94  68.69
Can’t say  3.46  5.44 7.84 8.70 9.45  0.00
N 462  515 319 506 254  99
 
 